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1. Introduction
In this paper, Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martínez reviews classical and contemporary work on
a fortiori arguments, or arguments based on ‘more or less,’ examining the conception, uses and
how to evaluate a fortiori arguments. If you have heard of a short song, “Everything you can do I
can do better, everything you can do I can do too,” the lyrics captures key elements of a fortiori
argument. In the argument, two cases A and B are compared, A has attribute x, so B should/must
have the same attribute x. How much light has she shed on this argument is the main focus of
this commentary. In this commentary, I will briefly summarize Martínez’ paper, draw our
attention to the strengths and then room for improvement.
2. Summary of the paper
In section 2 of her paper, Martínez draws on Rieke, Sillars and Peterson’s Argumentation and
Critical Decision Making and emphasizes the use of a fortiori argument in two phases of
decision-making process. It clarifies contexts in which a fortiori argument is used. In her
understanding, decision-making or deliberation seems to be an important situation in which
people use this argument type.
The third section of the paper draws on contemporary work by Marrud and Wiseman, and
defines this argument type as a “comparative” argument, and lays out its structure. In Martínez’
words, it can be put in the MP-mp-conclusion structure as follows:
Major Premise (the comparative one): A is more/less than B, A has property x,
(which include or exclude) B.
minor premise: A is / has property x
conclusion: a fortiori (with more reason) B is / has property (or not) x (Martínez,
p. 5)
From a pragmatic view, different uses of this argument type are for (1) determining the degree of
possession of a predicate by contrasting two ore more subjects/things/events, (2) strengthening a
position, (3) examining the plausibility of award of a characteristic or property, (4) ranking the
best examples of a class or category, and (5) helping to resolve dispute between two values or
alternatives.
The fourth section of this paper turns our attention to the work of Aristotle and examines
the issue of predication, linking it with Aristotle’s categories of accident, property, genre and
definition. Also, Martínez informs us of three different ways of presenting comparative
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superiority of two options: addition, extension, and subtraction. Based on these two sections, the
fifth section introduces five cases of a fortiori arguments:
Case 1: whether John should give a diamond or a gold necklace as a present from
to Mary
Case 2: whether a company renews its machinery for improvement of production
Case 3: whether a company reduces its employees to reduce the risk of
bankruptcy
Case 4: from which bank a person should get mortgage
Case 5: what would constitute quality of a good husband
The final section six of the paper uses the same examples and tackles the issue of evaluation of
these examples. With five sections, Martínez offers conception, different uses, classical roots,
examples, analysis and evaluative framework of a fortiori argument type.
3. Strengths and room for improvement
One general strength of Martínez’ paper is its broad-ranging coverage of a fortiori argument type.
Not only does it offer a conception and different uses of this argument type based on
contemporary and classical literature, but covers other issues such as analysis and evaluation.
With this paper she has started a good research program on this specific argument type.
Another strength of Martínez’ paper lies in sections three and four and, where Martínez
offers a conception and different uses of a fortiori argument type based on contemporary
literature and historicize it with classical literature of Aristotle’s Topica and On Rhetoric. Going
back to the classical literature and ‘re-’discovering the key elements of the argument type can
sometimes lead to better understanding of the research topic. In her paper, she links the topic
with Aristotle’s categories of accident, property, genre and definition, as well as three ways of
showing superiority between two competing propositions/positions: addition, extension and
subtraction. While there could be more ways of showing comparative superiority or inferiority,
offering these three based on Aristotle’s work helps us see clear ways for comparison. Another
strength is example a fortiori argument for analysis and evaluation. These examples collectively
link historical and contemporary theoretical accounts of a fortiori arguments and actual practices
of the argument-making.
Two general suggestions that I make for improving Martínez’ paper are substance and
form of the paper. As regards the substance, two comments center on conception and
classification of, as well as synthesis of different approaches to this argument type.
First, as I have sensed in my first exposure to the paper, and as it became clear during the
discussion of this paper at the conference, Martínez must offer a clear map surrounding this
argument type, with reference to a priori analogy argument and causal argument. As she presents
in section two of the paper, a typical example includes some comparison between two cases, like
the one between animals and humans in discussing respectful and considerate treatment of both.
If rights of humans precede those of animal and if A (animals) have property x (right to
respectful and considerate treatment), then it follows a fortiori that B (humans) (ought to) have
the same property. Comparing two similar cases and drawing a conclusion are key features of a
priori analogy, as several works by Trudy Govier have shown. In addition, case 4 of this paper
suggests that a person should get a mortgage from a bank with lower interest rate. This example
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seems to suggest a causal argument that compares relative consequential benefit because of
different interest rates. I do not mean that these two examples undermine what she advances.
However, the onus is on the author of the paper to make clear distinctions among these similar
argument types because different argument type may well require different analytical and
evaluative frameworks.
Another room for improvement in the substance of this paper lies in the synthesis of
different approaches to this argument type. In short, I would like her to weave different
literature/schools of thought together. If I make a list of people she draws on: Rieke and Sillars
from speech communication and debate tradition, Marraud, Wiseman, and Macagno & Walton
from contemporary argumentation studies, Aristotle or Quintilian from classical Greek and Latin
traditions, Eemeren from Pragma-Dialectical school of argumentation. The broad-ranging
literature she cites individually and collectively shows us the significance of the research topic.
However, if Martínez treats one school of thought in one section of paper and moves on to
another school in another section without clearly relating them together, the readers may be left
to question how and in what respect these different ideas are weaved to make a whole story about
a fortiori argument type. Rieke and Sillars, and Eemeren are key figures for showing a use of this
argument type in deliberation and decision-making in section two of the paper. Eemeren is also
important in evaluating biased and unbiased uses of this argument type with a theoretical
construct of strategic maneuvering in section six of this paper. Using Pragma-Dialectical theory
of argumentation for evaluation seems to imply that the author is committed to evaluate this
argument type as a violation of their procedural rules or rhetorical contextual factors such as
language or audience. However, turning our eyes to section three and four, she draws on Marraud,
Wiseman, Macagno and Walton, and Aristotle in analyzing a fortiori argument as product. These
two approaches toward evaluation are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but she could have
constituted a better whole by synthesizing these different approaches.
Given Martínez’ educational affiliation with logic and philosophy of science, my
suggestion to evaluation is to bring the logical tradition to the fore and to talk more about a
fortiori argument type as a product of argument, and use Pragma-Dialectical theory as a heuristic
tool to call our attention to certain contextual elements in actual cases. This may not satisfy
Pragma Dialecticians, but what is more important to her project is to provide a better account of
a fortiori argument types in terms of conception, analysis, different uses in different contexts, and
biased and unbiased ways of using this argument type.
The final suggestion for improving this paper concerns the form of presenting Martínez’
ideas. Every time she presents five cases in section five of this paper, she uses a table to show
relative merits of two or three competing options. For example, when she presents case 1, in
which John decides which jewels he gives to Mary—a diamond or a gold necklace, she lists a
table showing two options (a diamond and a gold necklace), and accompanying number with
which she intends to show relative merits. However, I am left to wonder what these numbers are.
What do they represent? How has the author come up with these numbers? If these numbers are
‘objective’ and ‘unbiased,’ what roles does evaluation of argumentation have? Providing more
detailed explanation about these points will easily answer my questions, but the onus is on the
author of the paper to develop her points much more in detail.
While I am a bit confused about some ways that Sandra Clemencia Valencia Martínez
presents her ideas, she has done a really nice job to call this community’s attention to a fortiori
argument type, paving a way to bridge logical, communicative, and dialectical approach to
arguments. I would like her to pursue this route and fully develop her ideas, so that we can better
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understand conception, analysis, evaluation, and different uses of this argument type.
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